Reviewed event layer
Browse reviewed exchange incidents and lifecycle disruptions linked back to entity dossiers and supporting evidence.
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Leading recorded types
Because the wind-down was described as immediate cessation of operations, HEI uses the announcement date as the effective closure marker for the Step Finance / Remora Markets group record.
Step Finance announced that Step Finance, SolanaFloor, and Remora Markets would wind down after failing to secure financing, acquisition, or another viable recovery path following the breach.
Polynomial's wind-down timeline scheduled forced liquidations for February 18, 2026 after operations ceased on February 14.
Polynomial announced the closure of Polynomial Chain and Polynomial Trade, cancellation of its planned Q1 2026 TGE, and a phased wind-down including forced liquidation, liquidity-layer closure, and chain shutdown.
South Korean regulators and authorities were reported to be inspecting Bithumb after the erroneous BTC crediting incident exposed internal-control and operational-risk concerns.
Bithumb restricted affected users' trading and withdrawals within about 35 minutes of the erroneous crediting incident and later recovered the vast majority of the mistaken balances.
Gemini announced it would close customer accounts in the United Kingdom, European Economic Area, and Australia, with a phased regional wind-down ending on April 6, 2026.
A February 2026 report described a Fastex Exchange service-termination notice and withdrawal-only state attributed to MiCA / regulatory alignment.
The wind-down plan scheduled the end of spot trading for January 31, 2026, followed by restrictions on contract trading and withdrawal-only handling.
Step Finance suffered a treasury-wallet breach in late January 2026. Reports place the loss in a broad USD 26-40 million range depending on source and accounting for recovered or affected Remora assets.
Matrix Limited permanently suspended its virtual-asset multilateral trading facility as part of an announced service wind-down.
The U.S. Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control designated Zedxion Exchange Ltd under Iran-sector and counterterrorism authorities. Treasury stated that Zedxion-linked addresses had processed funds for wallets linked to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and designated the exchange for operating in Iran's financial sector and materially supporting the IRGC.
CoinCatch formally ceased all platform operations, with only a temporary limited self-service withdrawal function remaining during the wind-down.
The U.S. Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control designated Zedcex Exchange Ltd pursuant to E.O. 13902 for operating in Iran's financial sector and pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for materially supporting the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.
BTCBOX suspended website and application access, account opening, crypto trading, Japanese-yen and crypto deposits and withdrawals, order functions, and transaction-history access from 2026-01-29 while conducting extended system and safety checks.
ProBit Global's shutdown roadmap ended spot trading and delisted all spot pairs on January 28, 2026.
A database migration / pricing-data error on Paradex briefly priced BTC at zero during maintenance, triggering mass unintended liquidations across perpetual markets.
The Seychelles Financial Services Authority issued a public notice concerning the BitStorage domain, company status, and virtual-asset authorisation.
ProBit Global announced a complete service wind-down, citing a rapidly evolving regulatory environment and strategic business restructuring.
Bit.com began a three-phase wind-down on December 27, 2025, disabled new user registrations, and directed users to withdraw assets or migrate balances to Matrixport.
CoinCatch announced a strategic wind-down and the orderly cessation of platform functions, including new registration, deposits, and trading services.
Bybit announced that it would discontinue services for Japanese residents and gradually apply account restrictions from 2026 in response to Japanese regulatory-compliance requirements, after earlier suspension of new Japan registrations.
Upbit urgently suspended digital-asset deposits and withdrawals after detecting abnormal activity involving Solana-network tokens and moved remaining assets to cold wallets.
Upbit detected abnormal withdrawals of Solana-network assets, with reporting estimating roughly USD 30-40 million or 54 billion KRW in assets transferred to an unauthorized external wallet.
Balancer v2 pools were exploited across multiple chains in November 2025, with secondary reports describing approximately USD 128 million drained and the flaw later cited as a source of legal exposure for Balancer Labs.